OPERATION JUST CAUSE

The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama

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Written shortly after the completion of Operation JUST CAUSE, this monograph traces the involvement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff in planning and directing combat operations in Panama. The study begins with the initial development of contingency plans in February l988 and concludes with General Manuel Noriega’s surrender to U.S. officials on 3 January l990. Relying primarily upon Joint Staff files and interviews with key participants, the author, Dr. Ronald Cole, provides an account of the parts played by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command in planning for operations in Panama and their roles in the combat operations that followed.

In accomplishing his task, Dr. Cole received valuable assistance from a large number of the key participants and members of the Joint Staff; their contributions are noted in the endnotes. The final manuscript was reviewed by Mr. Willard J. Webb and Dr. Walter S. Poole, edited by Ms. Penny Norman and typed by Ms. Helga Echols.

This monograph was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate U.S. government departments and agencies and cleared for release. Although the text has been declassified, some of the cited sources remain classified. The volume is an official publication of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Chairman or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

Director for Joint History

Washington, D.C.

November l995

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1. Background of the Crisis...............................................................................5

New Leadership and New Plans ................................................................   12

3. Trigger Events, The Decision to Intervene and Final Preparations 

for H-Hour, 15–19 December 1989............................................................. 27

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Monday, 18 December 1989: Movement Preparation,

the F-117A Decision, and the Execute Order ............................................ 30

Tuesday, 19 December 1989: Launching the Airlift .................................. 32

4. D-Day, Wednesday, 20 December 1989 ........................................... 37

Opposing Forces ...........................................................................................37

Actions by the Special Operations Forces ................................................ 38

The Conventional Task Forces ................................................................... 39

Explanation and Justification........................................................................ 42

Civil Affairs Reservists, the Media Pool, and U.S. Hostages .......... 45

Inside the National Military Command Center ........................................... 45

Civil Affairs .................................................................................................... 46

The Media Pool..................................................... ........................................ 47

The Hostage Issue ........................................................................................ 49

6. Last Combat, Civil Affairs, and the Hunt for Noriega, 

21–24 December 1989............................................................................... 51

Last Combat with the PDF........................................................................... 51

Civil Affairs and PROMOTE LIBERTY ....................................................... 52

The Hunt for Noriega..................................................................................... 54

7. The Nunciatura, 24 December 1989–3 January 1990 .................. 57

An Overview................................................................................................... 57

Rules of Engagement for Cordoning Off the Nunciatura ......................... 58

Rock Music at the Nunciatura ..................................................................... 59

Contretemps over Cuban and Nicaraguan Diplomatic Privileges........... 60

Negotiations with the Vatican....................................................................... 62

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and Redeployment, December l989–3 January l990........................ 65

End of the Fighting ......................................................................... ............. 65

Civil Affairs and the Question of Redeployment ....................................... 66

9. Assessments ......................................................................................... 71

Some Preliminary Assessments, January–April 1990............................. 71

The Impact of Goldwater-Nichols on JUST CAUSE................................. 72

Notes ............................................................................................................. 75

Index ............................................................. ................................................ 83

Map of Panama ........................................................................................... 89

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In the summer and fall of l989, while American attention focused on events in Eastern Europe which heralded the end of the Cold War, developments in Panama raised the possibility of combat much closer to home. Operations in Panama would test the changes to the U.S. military command system brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of l986. Panama would also try the team at the head of that system—President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, and  the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army. Strengthened by personal relationships formed during earlier administrations, this team would, in a large measure, determine the operational success of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.

Questions about the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the system of unified commands had been raised at intervals since the Vietnam War. In l982 the retiring Chairman, General David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, proposed increasing the authority of the Chairman and the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands and strengthening the joint staffs supporting them. Fueled by reported shortcomings in service cooperation and interoperability during the l983 invasion of Grenada and by the role of a cumbersome chain of command in the deaths of 24l U.S. Marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system prompted lengthy congressional deliberations and eventual enactment of the changes Jones had proposed.

Widely viewed as the most significant defense legislation since the National Security Act of l947, Goldwater-Nichols sought to streamline the command and control of U.S. military forces engaged in contingency operations. After designating the CJCS as the President’s principal military advisor, the Act made the Chairman specifically responsible for the preparation and review of contingency plans—a function he performed in conjunction with the CINCs. It further allowed the President to direct that communications between the National Command Authorities and the commanders of the unified commands be transmitted through the Chairman. The CINCs were, in turn, given full combatant command authority over their service components allowing them to control the organization and employment of these forces. Operation JUST CAUSE would demonstrate the effect of these changes.

In l988, as relations with Panama deteriorated, the commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., U.S. Army, had developed a strategy which gradually increased the strength of U.S. forces in Panama to deter the dictator, General Manuel Noriega, from attacking U.S. 

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citizens or interfering with the Panama Canal. If deterrence failed, Woerner planned to bring in additional forces from the United States over a three-week period before taking action against Noriega. But after Noriega overturned the results of the Panamanian election of May l989, President Bush lost patience with General Woerner’s approach and replaced him with General Maxwell R. Thurman, U.S. Army. Aggressive by nature, Thurman modified the BLUE SPOON plan to accommodate a major shift in the strategy for dealing with Noriega.

Accelerating the buildup of U.S. forces in Panama, Thurman also shortened the timetable for the deployment of additional forces from the U.S. to three days. Hoping to take Noriega by surprise, General Thurman intended to overwhelm the dictator’s forces before they could organize effective resistance or take U.S. citizens hostage.

Thurman took advantage of the CINC’s power under Goldwater-Nichols to select Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, U.S. Army, the Commander of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, to command a joint task force of 22,000 soldiers, 3,400 airmen, 900 Marines, and 700 sailors. General Powell approved Thurman’s action. The result was a force with unity of command and good interoperability which would rapidly achieve its operational objectives.

In late l989 relations with Panama grew sharply worse. On l5 December l989, the National Assembly passed a resolution that a state of war existed with the United States, and Noriega named himself the Maximum Leader. Violence followed the next evening when a Panamanian soldier shot three American officers; one, First Lieutenant Robert Paz, U.S. Marine Corps, died of his wounds. Witnesses to the incident, a U.S. naval officer and his wife, were assaulted by Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers while in police custody. On 17 December, after a review of these events and a briefing on BLUE SPOON, President Bush decided to act. Operation JUST CAUSE began shortly before 0l00 on 20 December with special operations forces attacking key installations in Panama.

In the early hours of 20 December, conventional task forces seized additional key points and the land approaches to Panama City. Task Force BAYONET then entered the city, secured the U.S. embassy and captured the PDF headquarters, La Comandancia, after a three- hour fight. With the Comandancia in U.S. hands and Noriega in hiding, centralized control of the PDF collapsed. However, fighting would flare sporadically for some time as U.S. forces overcame pockets of resistance.

As General Stiner’s force attained its objectives, General Powell became more directly involved in military operations due to the growing importance of the political aspects of JUST CAUSE. He did so to ensure that actions in Panama meshed with the administration’s political and diplomatic goals.

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During the first two days of the operation, Powell told Thurman to accelerate the drive to liberate the Marriott Hotel which held Americans who could become hostages. Powell also encouraged Thurman to move quickly to install the legally-elected government of Panama in office to discredit claims that Noriega still governed or that U.S. military rule was imminent.

After Noriega fled to the papal Nunciatura, U.S. troops played loud rock music outside the residence. When the Vatican and the diplomatic community complained to President Bush about this harassment, the Chairman ordered Thurman to stop the noise. Powell urged Thurman to have members of the new Panamanian government appeal directly to church officials in Panama and Rome for help in dislodging Noriega from the Nunciatura.

The operational success of JUST CAUSE rewarded efforts by Congress and the Bush administration to avoid repeating the mistakes of Lebanon and Grenada. The determination of President Bush and the enhanced authority of the Chairman and CINC combined to provide specific, readily attainable objectives and responsive and effective command and control while giving the tactical commander considerable operational freedom. However, when shortcomings in prior planning and mistakes by local commanders embarrassed the administration, General Powell acted to ensure the political success of the operation.

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Panama is an isthmus nearly four hundred miles long and fifty miles wide that connects Central America to the South American continent. About the size of South Carolina, Panama contains nearly 2.3 million Spanish-speaking people, most of mixed Spanish and Indian blood. Once a part of the Spanish colony that later became Colombia, Panama won its independence in 1903. That year, in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the new nation agreed to let the United States build a canal across the narrow part of the isthmus to link the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. In 1914 the United States completed the project within a U.S.-controlled "Canal Zone" extending five miles on either side of the 52-mile long waterway.

For more than six decades the Panama Canal played a pivotal role in U.S. strategic and commercial undertakings. In the age of transcontinental airplanes and intercontinental missiles, however, the importance of the Canal to the U.S. diminished.

Meanwhile, Panamanian nationalists increasingly resented the U.S. presence in their country. Eventually, U.S.-Panamanian negotiations led to an agreement whereby the United States promised to cede control of the Canal to Panama by the year 2000. In ratifying this treaty, the U.S. Senate inserted a proviso that permitted the United States to continue to defend the Panama Canal after 1999 if any interruption in the operation of the waterway occurred. The senators noted, however, that this proviso should not be interpreted as giving the United States the right to intervene in Panama’s internal affairs or otherwise infringe upon that country’s sovereignty.

In the decade following treaty ratification, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to view the Panama Canal as of great strategic value. During a conflict in Western Europe or the Middle East, possession of the Canal would speed the movement of U.S. naval vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic. In the hands of a government opposed to the United States, the JCS believed that Panama could be used as a wartime base by the Soviet Union or one of its client states, such as Cuba, to attack U.S. maritime operations or, in peacetime, to support left-wing insurgencies in Central America and drug trafficking with the United States.

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The Rise of Noriega

Manuel Antonio Noriega rose to power as an intelligence officer in the service of the dictator, Brigadier General Omar Torrijos. After the death of Torrijos in 1983, Noriega took over the Panama Defense Force (PDF), an organization that included the armed forces, police, customs and investigative services of Panama. Noriega continued his practice of cultivating friends and patrons within the U.S. intelligence community and clients within the Medellín drug cartel of Colombia. In 1985 the National Security Adviser to President Ronald W. Reagan, Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, U.S. Navy, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliott Abrams, warned Noriega of U.S. concern over his monopoly of power and involvement in the drug trade.

The first public confrontation between Noriega and the United States took place in June 1987. A former chief of staff in the PDF, Colonel Roberto Díaz-Herrera, accused his old master of complicity in the death of Torrijos, electoral fraud, and the 1985 murder of the leader of Noriega’s political opposition, Hugo Spadafora. During the anti-Noriega demonstrations that ensued, Noriega's riot police suppressed the unarmed demonstrators. The U.S. Senate promptly passed a resolution calling for the dictator to step down. A pro-Noriega mob attacked the U.S. embassy, and the State Department cut off economic and military aid to Panama. On 5 February 1988, federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida, indicted Noriega and his key henchmen on numerous counts of involvement in drug trafficking. Noriega demonstrated his defiance by replacing the nominal chief of state, President Eric Arturo Delvalle, with a Noriega crony, Manuel Solis Palma. Throughout 1988 and 1989, Noriega supported a campaign of harassing U.S. citizens in Panama and hindered full U.S. implementation of its rights under the 1977 Panama Canal treaties.

In l988 and l989 Noriega turned to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya for economic and military assistance. Cuba and Nicaragua funneled Communist bloc weapons and instructors to Panama and helped Noriega to develop civilian defense committees, the so-called Dignity Battalions, for intelligence collection and population control. Libya contributed $20 million in 1989 in return for Noriega’s permission to use Panama as a base to coordinate the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups throughout Latin America.

Even before the full impact of Cuban and Nicaraguan aid, the PDF contained 19 companies and 6 platoons numbering some 14,000 men, of whom at least 4,000 were well-trained and equipped for combat; equipment included 29 armored personnel carriers, 12 patrol craft, and 28 light transport aircraft. The PDF was 

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expected to strongly defend its headquarters, La Comandancia, in Panama City, as well as its bases at Fort Amador, Rio Hato, and the Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport. In addition, PDF forces had the capability to conduct sabotage and stand-off attacks against the Canal and U.S. military installations such as Quarry Heights, Fort Clayton, Howard Air Force Base, Albrook Air Force Base, and the U.S. naval station at Rodman. Noriega’s forces could retreat into the mountains and jungles of the interior and conduct prolonged guerrilla warfare.

Contingency Planning Begins, February–November 1988

After the U.S. federal indictments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., U.S. Army, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command (USCINCS0), to revise contingency plans intended to protect U.S. lives and property, to keep open the Canal, to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in peaceful or hostile environments, and to develop a plan to assist any government that might replace the Noriega regime. General Woerner and his director of operations, Brigadier General Marc A. Cisneros, U.S. Army (SOUTHCOM J-3), began work on a series of contingency plans collectively known as ELABORATE MAZE. Working with them was Major General Bernard Loeffke, commander of the U.S. Army South (USARSO), who would execute the plans as Commander, Joint Task Force Panama.

Based upon guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Woerner's early contingency plans envisioned a massive buildup of forces within U.S. bases in Panama that would either intimidate the PDF leaders under Noriega and cause them to overthrow him or, failing that, provide a force capable of invading Panamanian territory and overthrowing the PDF. President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., and General Woerner favored the mass approach over a surprise strategy, where forces from the United States would in concert with special operations forces and General Woerner’s troops conduct a sudden attack against Noriega and the PDF. At that time, concern was expressed that failure to capture Noriega soon after the initial assault might allow him to flee to the hills and organize guerrilla warfare. He might also order the abduction or killing of a number of the nearly thirty-five thousand U.S. citizens residing in Panama.

As Noriega ignored U.S. signals and became increasingly brutal during the nextyear, emphasis shifted toward a plan that embodied elements of both strategies. On 16 March 1988, a faction of the Panama Defense Force staged a coup 

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attempt at La Comandancia. Noriega suppressed the effort and purged the PDF of those whose loyalty he considered lukewarm. He also declared a state of national emergency, cracked down on political opposition, and stepped up anti-U.S. harassment, chiefly through severe travel restrictions, searches, and roadblocks.

Chairman Crowe asked General Woerner to break down ELABORATE MAZE into four separate operation orders to facilitate execution. General Woerner’s staff named the four operation orders collectively PRAYER BOOK. The first operation order, KLONDIKE KEY, covered noncombatant evacuation operations escorting U.S. citizens located throughout Panama to assembly areas in Panama City and Colón for evacuation to the United States.

The second operation order, POST TIME, planned for the employment of the 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama and forces deploying from the continental United States and the U.S. Atlantic Command, to defend U.S. citizens, U.S. installations, and the Panama Canal. The deploying forces would include a brigade from the 7th Infantry Division (Light), the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, one mechanized infantry battalion, and a carrier battle group. Incorporated into the computerized force deployment list, called Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), these forces would constitute the bulk of the force to be used for implementing the other two operation orders in the PRAYER BOOK series, BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC.

BLUE SPOON called for a joint offensive operation to defeat and dismantle the Panama Defense Force while protecting U.S. lives, U.S. property, and the Canal. As conceived by General Woerner and his staff, BLUE SPOON would begin with operations lasting up to eight days, conducted by the nearly twelve thousand troops already in Panama, who would then be joined, over a two-week period, by approximately ten thousand troops from the United States. A carrier battle group would interdict air and sea routes to Cuba and provide close air support while an amphibious task force would provide additional ground troops. In addition to U.S.-based forces listed for POST TIME, the SOUTHCOM commander would employ a joint task force of special operations forces from the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) for operations against the PDF leadership, command and control facilities, and airfields.

The special operations forces would also be tasked with the rescue of hostages, the conduct of reconnaissance in support of Joint Task Force Panama, and the location and seizure of Manuel Noriega.

The SOUTHCOM commander would exercise overall command of BLUE SPOON with U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Strategic Air Command (SAC), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),

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and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) in support.

SOUTHCOM would also be the tactical coordinating command with the Commander of Joint Task Force Panama and the Commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force conducting simultaneous, but separate, operations. The command and control arrangement for BLUE SPOON posed one other difficulty: the senior major general commanding the 7th Infantry Division (L) would serve under a junior major general commanding Joint Task Force Panama.

Once the initial assaults of BLUE SPOON had been completed, the joint task force could begin civil-military operations under the fourth operation order in the PRAYER BOOK series, BLIND LOGIC. Except for the carrier battle group, BLIND LOGIC would use the forces for POST TIME and BLUE SPOON with the addition of a civil affairs brigade. Planners from SOUTHCOM envisioned execution of BLIND LOGIC in three phases. During the immediate phase, civil affairs units would support ongoing combat actions and civilian efforts to reestablish public safety and public health measures. During the sustained phase, BLIND LOGIC operations would focus on restoring other essential services and transferring control over them to Panamanian and U.S. civilians. In the long range phase, U.S. civil affairs troops would work with the new Panamanian government to reconstruct the PDF, reducing its size and powers and institutionalizing its loyalty to civilian authority and democratic government.

8

From April 1988 until the summer of 1989 Lieutenant General Thomas W.

Kelly, U.S. Army, the Director of Operations on the Joint Staff (J-3), disagreed with the

SOUTHCOM J-3, Brigadier General Cisneros, on the chain of command to execute

BLUE SPOON. The disagreement began when General Cisneros contended that Major

General Loeffke’s Joint Task Force Panama (JTFPM) should be the principal planning

and operational headquarters. General Kelly and his staff argued that General Loeffke’s

JTFPM was only adequate to command the forces already in Panama. Once additional

brigades from the U.S. deployed, a corps commander would be needed to command and

control JTFPM, the 7th Infantry Division (L), and the Joint Special Operations Task

Force. In General Kelly’s view, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps had the staff and the rapid

deployment capability needed to plan and execute BLUE SPOON.

9

General Woerner resolved the dispute temporarily during the summer of 1988.

His staff had recently been augmented with at least thirteen personnel, and USCINCSO

had offered him special operations planners as well. With such expertise and the

experience his staff had with Noriega and the PDF, Woerner believed that SOUTHCOM

was fully qualified to serve as the warfighting headquarters for BLUE SPOON.

10

However, he recognized that if it became necessary to bolster JTFPM forces with

brigades from the United States, a corps headquarters would be needed to run the

operation. Thus, on 5 July 1988, General Woerner requested that Admiral Crowe

include a corps headquarters in the force list for BLUE SPOON, that is; within the

POST TIME TPFDD. In General Woerner’s mind, the corps headquarters would not

become operational until after the operation began. Admiral Crowe approved the

CINC’s request on 19 October and directed the Commander in Chief of Forces

Command, General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., U.S. Army, to revise the TPFDD

accordingly. Nine days later, General Palastra authorized the commander of the

XVIIIth Airborne Corps to establish liaison with SOUTHCOM.

10

According to General Woerner, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’ assumption of

tactical command and control would occur only after the execution of BLUE SPOON

had begun, when he found it necessary to deploy all U.S.-based forces listed in the

TPFDD of POST TIME. For this reason, the commander of the XVIIIth Airborne

Corps initially delegated planning responsibility back to JTFPM headquarters.

Throughout the period from July 1988 to summer 1989, however, the corps commander

monitored the development of JTFPM planning for the operation.

11

Unhappy with a command arrangement he believed incremental and disjointed,

Lieutenant General Kelly met with the J-3s from SOUTHCOM and FORSCOM on 8

November 1988. They discussed two questions: Should the corps headquarters deploy

in increments or completely? And should it deploy soon after execution had begun, or

later, after all combat forces had deployed? General Kelly tried without success to

convince SOUTHCOM J-3 to deploy the corps headquarters as a complete package

before all combat forces had deployed. Admiral Crowe apparently sympathized with

Kelly’s preference, but did not overrule SOUTHCOM at that time.

found asylum in the papal Nunciatura.

own coup. He planned to seize PDF headquarters, La Comandancia, in Panama City

advance to the Comandancia to rescue their leader. Giroldi also requested that his

family be given sanctuary and that no U.S. aircraft fly near the Comandancia and give

Upon learning that Noriega would not visit the Comandancia on 2 October,

some units near intersections west of the Comandancia for possible blocking

over U.S. forces west of Panama City and entered the Comandancia

from the east. Inside the Comandancia Noriega persuaded Giroldi to surrender. After